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Abstract 
Venture capital (VC) investment has long been conceptualized as a local business, in which the 
VC’s ability to source, syndicate, fund, monitor, and add value to portfolio firms critically depends 
on their access to knowledge obtained through their ties to the local (i.e., geographically 
proximate) network. Consistent with the view that local networks matter, existing research 
confirms that local and geographically distant portfolio firms are sourced, syndicated, funded, and 
monitored differently. Curiously, emerging research on VC investment practice within the United 
States finds that distant investments, as measured by “exits” (either initial public offering or 
merger & acquisition) out-perform local investments. These findings raise important questions 
about the assumed benefits of local network membership and proximity. To more deeply probe 
these questions, we contrast the deal structure of cross-border VC investment with domestic VC 
investment, and contrast the deal structure of cross-border VC investments that include a local 
partner with those that do not. Evidence from 139,892 rounds of venture capital financing in the 
period 1980-2009 suggests that cross-border investment practice, in terms of deal sourcing, 
syndication, and performance indeed change with proximity, but that monitoring practices do not. 
Further, we find that the inclusion of a local partner in the investment syndicate yields surprisingly 
few benefits. This evidence, we argue, raises important questions about VC investment practice 
as well as the ability of firms to capture and lever the presumed benefits of network membership.  
 
 
JEL Classifications:  E20, E65, N14, O52, P52  
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Venture capital (VC) investment has long been conceptualized as a local business, 
and the scholarly canon provides three complimentary reasons why this ought to be so. 
First, agency issues between the VC and the entrepreneurial firm are severe. Venture 
capitalists attempt to mitigate uncertainty and the threat of adverse selection by relying 
on networks of trusted partners to refer or source promising deals; conduct intensive due 
diligence including on-site visits and in-person reference checking; and build investment 
syndicates with other VC firms. The ability to tap local networks for deal sourcing and 
syndication, as well as the non-trivial expense of due diligence processes, suggest that the 
cost of investment will be sensitive to the distance between VCs, as well as the firms in 
which they plan to invest (Gompers, 1995; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist and Lu, 2010; Guler & Guillén, 2010a).  
  Second, VCs provide portfolio firms with more than capital (Hsu, 2004). They 
add value by facilitating access to key technical and management talent (Hellman and 
Puri, 2002), providing advice and coaching (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989) facilitating 
entry into new markets (Hsu, 2006), brokering strategic alliances (Lindsey, 2008), and 
shepherding the firm through the initial public offering or trade sale process (Barry, et al., 
1990; Brav and Gompers, 1997). VCs intensively monitor portfolio firms post-investment 
by taking positions on the board of directors and by tying additional investment to the 
achievement of performance objectives (Gompers, 1995). These value-added services are 
more difficult and more costly to provide at a distance. 
  Third, research confirms that the demography of the VC industry is characterized 
by geographic concentration or clustering of in terms of both location and patterns of 
investment. Chen, Gompers, Kovner, and Lerner (2010) and Cumming and Dai (2010) 
3find that more than half of all U.S.VCs are located in three metropolitan areas (San Jose, 
Boston, and New York) and that more than half of all VC investment (and 54% of all 
investment rounds) are made in companies located in these regions. Patterns of 
investment also reflect a strong local bias. Chen et al (2010) estimate that VCs are 
approximately six times more likely to invest in a firm located in their local CSA 
(combined statistical area) than in more distant locations.  
Against this backdrop, two developments are surprising. The first is that recent 
research on VC investment practice within the United States found that distant 
investments, as measured by “exits” (IPO or merger and acquisition) out-perform local 
investments. While Chen et al (2010) speculate this out-performance is the product of a 
higher “hurdle rate” on non-local investment, the fact they also find that returns decline 
with repeated investment in non-local regions is curious given existing assumptions about 
the how VCs add value to portfolio firms, as well as the presumed benefits of privileged 
access to network-derived local knowledge. Second, the rising trend in cross-border VC 
investment (rising from 4% of total VC investment in 1995 to a high of 19% in 2006) is 
incommensurate with core assumptions of the proximity and network hypotheses, both of 
which favor local investment. Existing research, however, sheds little light on how 
investment practice varies with distance. Are cross-border deals structured the same as 
local deals? Do non-local partners perform the same functions as local partners? Do they 
add value as effectively as local partners?  
  To more deeply probe these questions, we explore the effect of proximity and 
local networks on investment practice and VC returns by contrasting cross-border VC 
investment with domestic VC investment, and cross-border investments that include a 
4local partner with those that do not. We develop and test hypotheses about the effect of 
cross-border risk on three dimensions of investment practice (deal sourcing, deal 
structuring, and deal monitoring) and investment performance using data from 139,892 
rounds of venture capital financing in the period 1980-2009. If the proximity hypothesis 
is correct, deal structure should change when borders are crossed. If network theory is 
correct, VCs will have incentive to include local partners in the investment syndicate in 
an effort to improve information quality, mitigate distance-related risk, mitigate country-
related risk, add value to the target firm, reduce monitoring costs and enhance firm 
performance. It follows that cross-border deals that include local partners should become 
more like local deals. Contrary evidence would then raise important theoretical questions 
about presumed benefits of network membership, as well as the member firm’s ability to 
lever network-derived advantages in both local and distant markets.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
To date, social network theory has played a prominent role in the exploration of 
VC investment in the fields of management (Guler & Guillén, 2010a), finance 
(Hochberg, Ljungqvist & Lu, 2007) and sociology (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Social 
networks are viewed as playing as crucial role in locating and evaluating investment 
opportunities, forming investment syndicates, providing value-added services such as 
finding managerial talent and establishing relationships with critical suppliers and 
customers, and providing oversight. VC’s develop and sustain networks of professional 
relationships by referring deals to friends, inviting them to join investment syndicates, 
sharing ideas and knowledge about emerging technologies, and engaging in other acts of 
reciprocity. Continued reciprocity, as well as increased frequency of information 
5exchange, are viewed as sources of increased social stature (Podolny, 2005), and as 
credible signals of firm quality and partner integrity (Jensen and Roy, 2003). Those who 
are centrally located, and are thus advantaged with respect to the quantity information 
flows, are thought to be in a position to obtain information earlier and/or of better quality 
than those who are located less proximally within the local VC network. Social network 
theory thus views proximity as a relational construct that moderates the firm’s ability to 
leverage the benefits of network membership (Burt, 1992; Podolny, 2005). 
The role of geographic proximity in social network theory is, however, a bit more 
ambiguous. The notion that geographic proximity is important is readily evident in the 
theory: geographic proximity greatly facilitates the frequency of exchange and acts of 
reciprocity. Valuable knowledge—that is, information that is costly to exchange-is also 
viewed as being deeply embedded into a context that can only be understood and 
appreciated by those experienced in it. Notions of geographic proximity are frequently 
evoked in theory (e.g., local and home; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Hochberg et al, 2010), 
and different types of network-based advantage are recognized as being more readily 
transferable (or location-specific) than others. Guler & Guillén (2010a) for example, posit 
that network-derived marketing and information brokerage advantages are location-
specific while others, such as social status, may be more readily transferred across 
markets and locations. In the main, geographic proximity is viewed as facilitating the 
firm’s ability to lever network benefits, and so moderates the relationship between 
network membership and performance. 
  However, geographic proximity plays a different role in financial and economic 
theory. Financial theory, for example, directly relates distance with risk. Both theoretical 
6work (Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2004) and empirical 
evidence (Gompers, 1995; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Brander, Amit and Antweiler, 
2002; Chen, Gompers, Kovner and Lerner, 2010; Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu, 2010) 
confirm that risk is strongly associated with distance from the home office. Firms that are 
more distant from the home office receive less favorable terms, smaller rounds of 
investment, and less total capital investment (Gompers, 1995; Bengtsson & Ravid, 2010). 
Distance from the home office is associated with larger syndicate sizes (Sorenson & 
Stuart, 2001) and also reduces the likelihood of that the distant investor will take a seat 
on the board of directors (Gompers, 1995). Bengtsson and Ravid (2010) find that 
“contractual harshness,” which is defined as the extent to which U.S. VC investment 
contracts include cash flow contingencies that favor investors; e.g., anti-dilution clauses, 
also rises sharply when the VC and the target company are located in different states.  
  Geographic proximity, on the other hand, is not only viewed as directly reducing 
risk and transaction cost, but is also thought to greatly facilitate the VC firm’s ability to 
add value to its portfolio firms by, as noted earlier, providing access to needed physical 
and managerial resources, making advice and counsel readily available, and so forth. 
Geographic proximity thus indirectly enhances VC firm performance. Theory, then, 
suggests that proximity should be both directly and indirectly related to investment 
practice and performance outcomes, whereas network effects should be indirectly related 
to the same.  
  In this paper, we test this supposition by extending this line of reasoning to the 
cross-border context, an environment in which the effect of distance-associated risk, or 
proximity, on VC investment should be readily evident. While a combination of travel 
7and technology could, in principle, reduce the effect of within-nation distance-related 
risk, the cross-border context adds layers of investment risk that technology and travel 
cannot ultimately ameliorate. Such sources of risk include fluctuation in currency values, 
new (changing) regulatory environments, capital market quality, and sovereign risk. The 
cross-border context also places into relief the importance of the local VC network since 
the offshore investor is necessarily disadvantaged relative to local investors from a 
network perspective. Theory, however, strongly suggests these disadvantages can be 
ameliorated through alliance with local investors.Hence, we anticipate that the cross-
border context will contour deal sourcing, structuring, and monitoring practices, as well 
as the performance of cross-border venture capital investment in a manner that allows us 
to tease apart their direct and indirect effects, and so reveal information about whether 
and how these effects are made manifest.  
One straightforward solution for mitigating risk in VC investments is to alter deal 
sourcing practice by, for example, investing in entrepreneurial firms that are in later 
stages of development. For early-stage firms to grow to maturity, infusions of human 
capital (in the form of VC attention and additional human resources) along with financial 
capital are often required (Hellmann and Puri, 2000). In later stages of investment, less 
time, attention, and capital is required of the VC, as much of the risk associated with the 
technology or with the viability of the business model has been resolved (Gompers, 
1995). Information asymmetry between investors and entrepreneurs is also most 
pronounced in young firms and early-stage investments (Bergemann and Hege, 1998; 
Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2004), and are reduced with maturity. Cross-border risk can 
also be reduced by investing in target firms located in larger and/or more stable 
8economies (e.g., Germany), and/or in nations that have better quality (i.e., less risky) 
capital markets (e.g., United Kingdom) (Balcarcel, Hertzel, and Lindsey, 2009). The 
proximity hypothesis thus suggests that cross-border investments will tend to be in more 
mature, later stage companies when compared with domestic investments. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Cross-border investments will tend to be made in older firms 
and/or those that are at later stages of development than domestic VC 
investments. 
 
The network hypothesis asserts that VCs develop and structure networks to help 
promote the exchange of information, resources, and expertise. Offshore VCs who 
establish relationships with local VCs have the opportunity to learn about economic 
conditions in the target market, and to observe how their partners navigate in the local 
entrepreneurial landscape (Guler & Guillén, 2010a). Partnership with local VCs might 
then allow the offshore VC to identify promising investment opportunities in younger 
firms and in those that are at earlier stages of development. Partnership with local VCs 
may also yield long-term dividends by facilitating eventual deal exit via merger or 
acquisition of the target firm by other local firms or investors (Chemmanur, Hull, and 
Krishnan, 2010). Finally, relationships with a local partner may facilitate investment by 
reducing the investor’s exposure to political, legal, or regulatory sources of risk.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Cross-border investments that include a local venture firm in the 
syndicate are likely to be in younger firms and or firms at earlier stages of 
development than cross-border investments made by syndicates that exclude a 
local partner.  
9  Another common way to mitigate risk in VC investment is to add additional 
investors to the financing round (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994). Syndication reduces risk 
by amortizing the cost of a failed investment across a larger group of investors. The 
presence of more investors may also serve as a positive signal about the underlying 
quality of the investment (Brander et al., 2002). Building on insights from previous 
empirical work in a U.S. setting (Lerner, 1994; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Hochberg et 
al., 2007) scholars have suggested that the greater risk of cross-border VC investment 
should lead to increased syndicate size (Guler and McGahan, 2006).  
 
Hypothesis 3: The number of syndicate partners in cross-border deals will be 
higher than in domestic investment syndicates. 
 
The network hypothesis suggests that offshore syndicate have incentive to change 
the composition of the investment syndicate by choosing to recruit a local VC as a 
member. First, and as noted earlier, local VCs are embedded in networks that provide 
numerous information advantages to its members, advantages that are simply not 
available to outsiders. Improved information may allow the investment syndicate to 
identify more attractive investment opportunities and/or to better evaluate the quality of 
its management team. Local partners may also be more knowledgeable about local 
market conditions as well as the effects of technological change on the target firm’s 
capabilities. Outside firms might also seek local partners in an effort to overcome legal or 
regulatory barriers, and/or to reduce their associated costs. The prospect that partnership 
with offshore investors will increase the local VC’s access to financial resources and 
offshore investment opportunities also gives it incentive to join the cross-border 
10syndicate. The proximity of the local VCs to the target firm also reduces the transaction 
costs of sourcing and structuring the investment in ways that mitigates distance-related 
risk. It is not immediately clear, however, whether the local VC’s role in the syndicate is 
as substitute for an offshore partner – in which case syndicate size should not grow – or if 
they are viewed as a complement to information resources provided by existing partners 
and/or as a mechanism for diversifying risk, in which case syndicate size should grow. 
Since it seems likely that local partners will provide the most financial benefit to 
syndicate members when the local investor serves as a substitute for another (off-shore) 
investor, we posit that cross-border syndicates that include a local partner are likely to be 
smaller than domestic syndicates.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Cross-border investment syndicates that include local partners will 
be smaller than cross-border syndicates that do not include a local partner.  
 
After having made the investment in an entrepreneurial firm, VCs can continue to 
mitigate risk by engaging in intensive monitoring and oversight by varying: (1) the 
amount and timing of capital infusions and (2) representation on the board of directors of 
the entrepreneurial firm.  
Providing capital to an entrepreneurial firm in tranches over time—known as 
staging—may be the most potent monitoring and risk reduction mechanism that VCs can 
employ (Sahlman, 1990). The delivery of financing in discrete stages, whether at the time 
of initial investment, as well as over subsequent financing rounds, facilitates periodic re-
evaluation of the entrepreneurial firm. Monitoring can also be increased by reducing the 
11amount of time between funding rounds. As noted by Gompers (1995) this keeps the 
entrepreneur on a “tight leash” and reduces potential losses. In a random sample of 794 
U.S. VCs, Gompers (1995) finds that staging is a potent mechanism for monitoring: firms 
that do not perform well are cut off from subsequent financing. Chemmanur et al (2010) 
draw from data about cross-border VC investment in emerging economies and conclude 
that staging appears to substantially offset the larger monitoring costs associated with 
investment in distant economies. Building on these insights, we propose that the amount 
of capital provided by an investment syndicate per round in cross-border deals will be 
lower when compared to domestic deals. We also expect that the time between financing 
rounds will be shorter for cross-border investments: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Cross-border deals are characterized by (a) smaller amounts of 
capital per round, and (b) shorter time between rounds when compared to 
domestic deals. 
 
However, the network advantages of local partnership ought to provide 
information advantages that mitigate the agency costs associated with cross-border 
investment. Local partnerships (and increased flow of local knowledge) might also help 
the investment syndicate adapt better to changing institutional and competitive 
conditions, and to shape the flow of needed resources to altered circumstances 
(Chemmanur et al, 2010; Balcarcel et al, 2009). As a result, we anticipate that local 
partnership will loosen the financial leash such that we observe increased funding per 
round and an increase in the period between rounds. These relationships should be readily 
12observed in syndicates that have significant cross-border investment experience, and so 
are better able to manage distance-related risk.  
 
Hypothesis 6: The presence of local investors in a cross-border investment 
syndicate round is associated with (a) larger amounts of capital per round, and 
(b) increased time between rounds as compared to cross-border deals that lack a 
local partner. 
 
In work examining the oversight of entrepreneurial firms in a sample of U.S. 
venture deals, Lerner (1995) finds that VC board representation is greater both when the 
need for oversight is higher; e.g., during the transition to a new chief executive officer, 
and when it is more convenient (less costly) for the investing firm to do so. Consistent 
with these conjectures, Lerner (1995) also shows that organizations with offices within 
five miles of the VC firm are twice as likely to have VC board members as those more 
than five hundred miles away. Given distance, attention, and the impact of travel on 
board representation in previous research (Gompers, 1995; Cumming and Dai, 2010; 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2001) the proximity hypothesis suggests that the likelihood of the VC 
taking a board seat should be lower in cross-border deals when compared to domestic 
deals: 
 
Hypothesis 7: The likelihood of a venture capitalist taking a board seat is lower in 
cross-border deals than in domestic deals. 
 
13  The notion that board representation is the key communication conduit between 
VCs and their portfolio firms is an implicit element of both the proximity and network 
hypotheses. Board service allows the VC to directly engage with firm management, and 
to gain a deeper understanding of firm strategy, as well as the nature of the problems it 
faces (Hochberg et al, 2007). VCs also add value by facilitating the flow of information 
between the target firm and members of the VC’s network (Hsu, 2004). Such knowledge 
should be valuable in cross-border contexts, in which “local knowledge” may have 
played an important role in deal sourcing and syndicate formation (Chemmanur et al, 
2010). However, local knowledge is, by definition, difficult to transfer, which makes 
direct engagement with portfolio firms relatively more important for cross-border 
investments than for domestic investments (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Guler and 
McGahan, 2007).  
 
Hypothesis 8: The likelihood of a venture capitalist taking a board seat is higher 
in cross-border deals when the investment syndicate includes a local partner. 
 
We now consider the performance implications of the proximity hypothesis. It is 
not clear whether proximity and performance necessarily go hand in hand. After all, if 
VC is indeed a primarily local business, and most investment is local, then competition 
for local investment opportunities among venture capital firms might give them incentive 
to accept lower returns, or take on relatively greater risk, when investing in local firms 
(Chen et al, 2010; Cumming and Dai, 2010). It also gives them incentive to invest in 
distant markets, providing the promised returns exceed the costs and risks associated with 
14more distant investment. The paradoxical implication is that returns from distant 
investments, which have a higher hurdle rate, might then be stronger for VC firms than 
local investments. Chen et al. (2010) test this proposition using a sample of hand-
collected data on branch offices in United States Combined Statistical Areas (CSA) over 
the period 1975 to 2005 and find non-local investments outperformed investments that 
were made closer to a home office. In further tests, the authors documented that the 
observed difference in performance was equally attributable to early and late-stage 
investments, which reduces the probability that superior performance was the product of 
VC firms “cherry picking” distant investments that are nearing exit. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that VCs will require higher hurdle rate for distant investments in order to 
overcome the increased cost and risk associated with sourcing, adding value to, and 
monitoring a distant portfolio firm, and so should experience relatively greater returns: 
 
Hypothesis 9: Cross-border VC investments are more likely to have successful 
outcome (IPO or merger and acquisition) than domestic investments. 
 
The curious, and ironic, implication of this line of reasoning is that if an offshore 
investment is indeed sufficiently attractive to justify foreign investment, it is also possible 
that it does not require the sort of intensive local monitoring or short financial leash that 
the proximity hypothesis suggests is needed. Competition among both local and offshore 
VCs for attractive investment opportunities may also give offshore investors incentive to 
“sweeten the deal” by reducing the intensity of monitoring or to rely upon less intrusive 
mechanisms (e.g., periodic management reports, Twitter traffic, and so on) to monitor 
15performance. It follows that offshore investors may have incentive to eschew local 
partners when investment opportunities are most attractive, but, as both the proximity and 
network hypothesis suggest, to add them when attractive offshore investment 
opportunities are difficult to identify or evaluate, and/or when added risk justifies more 
intense supervision. The somewhat surprising implication is that we might then expect 
VCs to use the identical deal structure for attractive investments, regardless of location, 
but to increase monitoring and strive to add value when they undertake less optimal 
investments. In such cases, local syndicate partners may be recruited in an effort to 
reduce the transactions cost of supervision and/or to better add value to the portfolio firm. 
Accordingly, we anticipate that returns for offshore VC investments that involve a local 
partner will be lower than offshore investments that do not involve a local syndicate 
partner: 
 
Hypothesis 10: Cross-border VC deals that include a local partner in the deal 
will perform worse than cross-border deals that do not involve a local partner. 
 
SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
The data for our study are mainly drawn from the VentureXpert database, which 
provides detailed information on VC investment including the dates of financing rounds, 
the amount invested, the VC firms participating in the investment, and information on the 
entrepreneurial firm including its stage of development, location, and industry. 
VentureXpert is the only VC investment database endorsed by the National Venture 
Capital Association (NVCA) and has been used extensively in research on VC 
16investment (e.g. Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Guler and Guillén, 2010a, b; Hochberg et. al. 
2007, 2010). 
Two well-known shortcomings of VentureXpert are that information about fund 
performance data is incomplete, and the database does not include information that 
positively identifies which member of the investment syndicate joined the board of the 
target firm on the date of investment. To obtain performance data, drew on two SDC 
databases: SDC Global New Issues and SDC Mergers and Acquisitions. We also use 
Pratt’s Guide to Venture Capital Investment and Thomson Venture One to obtain 
information about venture firm location (when missing). None of the available databases, 
however, positively identify the newly appointed board member, forcing us to rely on a 
coarse measure—whether a syndicate member took a board seat in a particular financing 
round—to test our propositions.
1  
Our sample excludes data for financing rounds allocated to buyouts, bridge loans, 
and acquisitions, as well as corporate venture capital (CVC) investments. Previous 
studies examining CVC find that the motives for investment differ from that of 
professional VC, often investing for strategic reasons only partially related to investment 
returns, and that CVC organizations often have a different organizational form and 
incentive structures as compared to traditional VC firms, and these differences are likely 
to influence patterns of investment, approaches to monitoring and governance, and 
ultimately performance (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Hellmann, 2002). 
                                                 
1 While some researchers have used a process of elimination to identify the lead investor in 
certain circumstances, this data is only valid under conditions that our questions exclude. Also, 
reliability of the resulting data cannot be positively verified. For example, while we may be able 
to identify the board member in cross-border deals in which syndicate size equals two, we cannot 
do so in syndicates that have more than two members, or in domestic investments, or in a variety 
of other situations.  
17For the purposes of this study, we restrict analysis to VC investments made 
between 1980 and 2009, and to investments made in the USA and EU-15. Investments 
prior to 1980 have been excluded due to data quality concerns (Kaplan et al., 2002). We 
restricted our focus to the USA and EU-15 for two reasons. First, deal-level data for 
investments in these developed nations is relatively complete and performance data is 
both available and verifiable, allowing for reliable analysis. Deal-level data about 
investments in lesser-developed economies is less complete—many fields are missing —
and performance data is less reliable and often unobtainable. Second, variance in levels 
of economic development could introduce a potential confound in our research design 
since venture investment in developed and developing nations are likely to have different 
motivations. For example, it seems reasonable to assume that most VC investment in 
developed nations is financially motivated. Venture investment in developing nations, on 
the other hand, is viewed as an engine of economic growth, and so is often subsidized by 
government or international institutions like the World Bank. The Israeli government, for 
example, heavily subsidizes R&D investment by private firms and, for a period in the 
1990’s, and even created a tax haven for offshore investors; i.e., investment proceeds 
were not taxed by Israel or the investor’s home nation (Lach, 2002). We also reason that 
the USA and EU are relatively homogeneous with respect to information technology, 
transportation, quality of legal and other regulatory institutions, and quality of their 
capital markets, thereby enhancing the quality of our tests of hypotheses concerning 
investment practice and, most importantly, venture performance.  
Our sample includes 70,020 entrepreneurial firms that received a total of 139, 892 
rounds of financing during the sample period 1980-2009. Nearly half of these 
18entrepreneurial firms (34,674) are located in the U.S., leaving 35,346 ventures located in 
the rest of the world, underscoring the international representation in our sample. Over a 
period of 29 years, a total of 13,297 different VC firms undertook rounds of investment. 
The sample is balanced between VC firms based in the U.S. (7,146) and outside the U.S. 
(6,151).  
We test our core hypotheses using negative binomial and Probit regression, a 
form of logistic regression that effectively transforms the model so that the fitted values 
are bounded within the range of probabilities. In our probit models, we follow Hoetker 
(2007) and use a maximum likelihood estimation method (MLS) to explore the value and 
statistical significance of the marginal effect of explanatory variables. Lastly, and as 
suggested by Wiersema and Bowen (2009), we estimate the practical significance of our 
probit results by calculating the marginal impact of a unit change xki on the probability 
that yi equals 1 (given by βk F(zi), where βk is the parameter attached to xki).  
We use five dependent variables and eleven independent variables in our Probit 
and negative binomial regression models. Our main dependent variable, Cross-Border 
Deal, is a dummy variable that identifies whether the deal is a cross-border deal (1) or a 
domestic deal (0). A deal is classified as cross-border if the national affiliation of any 
member of the investment syndicate differs from the national affiliation of the target firm. 
In domestic deals, the national affiliation of the target firm and all syndicate members is 
identical.  Local Investor is a dummy variable (1/0) that indicates whether the home 
nation of the syndicate member is the same as the national affiliation of the target firm. 
We code Age of the target firm at first investment in years. We followed Gompers (1995) 
19and coded rounds described as “early” or “seed” in VentureXpert as Early Stage 
investment.  
Syndicate  Size is the total number of partners involved in each round of 
investment. Syndicate size is used as an IV in our probit regressions (all of which use 
cross-border investment as the DV) and as a DV in tests concerning syndicate size (H3 & 
H4). Prior International Investment is measured as the average number of international 
investments that had been undertaken by syndicate members prior to the date of 
investment in the target firm. We control for international investment experience because 
those who know more about offshore markets may source or structure cross-border deals 
differently than those with less international experience. 
We use Time  between rounds  (in days) and round Amount (in thousands of 
constant USD) to examine characteristics of investment staging. Board Seat is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a syndicate member takes a seat on the board of 
entrepreneurial firm and 0 otherwise. We also use board seat as a DV in our tests of H7 & 
H8. While it is customary for the lead investor—the partner who organized the syndicate 
and makes the largest financial investment—to take a board seat in early investment 
rounds (Series A and so on), this is not necessarily true in later stages. For example, some 
syndicate members may already be represented on the board due to earlier investment in 
the target firm – in which case their participation in the current round is a consequence of 
their earlier commitment to the portfolio firm—or because existing investors (e.g., the 
founder and VCs) are able to resist requests for added board seats as a condition of 
investment. Firms may be able to resist such requests if the investment is small, if 
ownership had already been diluted to the point where added investment does not merit a 
20board seat, or if further dilution would not be in the investors’ interests. For example, it 
may not be in the investor’s interest to further reduce the executive team’s (ownership) 
incentive to bring the firm to a stage where investors can exit via IPO or M&A. We also 
use dummy variables that detail whether or not the target firm successfully exited through 
IPO or merger and acquisition (M&A) and use these as dependent variables in our tests of 
H9 & H10.  
We use a series of dummy variables to control for year, industry, and country 
effects. Our sample includes data from investments in 69 industries and 16 nations over a 
29 year period (See Tables IV and V). We tested the robustness of our results for cross-
border investment by running our regressions over time in three to five year windows, 
and rolling the same windows across the period 1980-2009. We also test the robustness 
of our claims concerning cross-border risk by replacing our country dummy variable with 
Country Risk Premium and with Political Risk in our models. We follow Damodaran 
(2006) and use a nation’s long-term equity risk premium as our proxy for Country Risk 
Premium, a measure which we derive using Moody’s county rating, estimates of the 
nation’s default spread, and estimates of the relative market volatility for each nation (see 
Appendix 1). We measure Political Risk using the Political Risk Index which is available 
from Political Risk Services, a commercial information services firm (www. 
prsgroup.com). The Political Risk Index consists of 12 components measuring various 
dimensions of the political and business environment facing firms operating in a country. 
The data is updated monthly and reported in their International Political Risk Guide. We 
use data from December reports for 1984 (first year available) to 2009. Since information 
is not available for all time periods, our samples are left-censored. Our sample for 
21Country Risk Premium includes 46,211 observations. Our sample for Political Risk 
includes 108,406 observations. 
 RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics for our sample are reported in Table I and correlations in 
Table II. Tests (available on request) confirm the data is multivariate normal. Hausman 
tests confirm the use of robust standard errors adequately compensated for threats related 
to serial correlation.  
[Insert Table I and II About Here] 
Turning to Table I, we see that nearly 12 percent of the deals in our sample were 
cross-border investments and 93% of all deals include local investors. It follows that 
approximately 7% of all investment rounds were made by syndicates that did not include 
a local investor. The age of the target firm receiving venture financing is just over five 
years and approximately 10% of the rounds of investment were in firms in the early 
stages of development. The median syndicate size was 2 and members of the investment 
syndicate had made, on average, one or two cross-border investments prior to investing in 
the focal firm. Investment experience varied widely, from 0 to 125. While the latter 
statistic seems high, it is attributable to biotech investment, which is distinctive due to the 
high number of relatively small rounds of investment that characterizes investment in this 
industry. The average ground amount was $370,000 and the median interval between 
rounds is roughly three months (99 days). Consistent with earlier research, we find VCs 
take a board seat in just over half (53%) of their rounds of investment in portfolio firms. 
Sixteen percent of venture-backed companies in our sample exited through an IPO, while 
22fourteen percent merged or were acquired, statistics that are consistent with recent 
research on exit performance (Chen et al, 2010; Chemmanur et al, 2010).  
Inspection of the correlation table (Table II) revealed no anomalies. Apart from a 
high correlation between cross-border investment and local investor (.53), no other 
correlation exceeded 0.22, which suggests that the threat of multicollinearity is low. The 
correlation between cross-border investment and country risk premium is positive, (0.09; 
p≤ .001), corroborating our assumption that cross-border investment is financially riskier 
than domestic investment.  
[Insert Tables III through V About here] 
Table III summarizes cross-border investment by year for the period 1980 to 
2009. Table III confirms that cross-border investment has become increasingly common 
over the period, rising to a high 23% of total VC investment in 2002 before tapering in 
the wake of 9/11 to about 15% of total annual VC investment from 2003 until the global 
banking crisis of 2008. Table IV describes the pattern of VC investment by industry. Not 
surprisingly, computer software dominated, capturing 15% of the sample and 12% of 
cross-border investment. The overall pattern of cross-border investment looks much like 
domestic investment: the same 10 industries appear in the top 12 of both lists. Inspection 
of the industry dummy variable coefficients indicates that patterns of cross-border 
investment materially differed in only two of the 69 industries represented in the sample. 
Specifically, about 1% fewer cross-border investments were made in business services 
and computer peripherals than were made in domestic investments.  
  Table V describes VC investment by nation. The greatest number and amount of 
investments were made in the USA, followed by the United Kingdom and France. 
23Results confirm the patterns of cross-border investment differed from domestic 
investment for six out of 16 nations, with proportionally fewer cross-border investments 
made in the most active VC markets, which include the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
[Insert Tables VI through VII About Here] 
 Table VI compares the means of our independent variables for domestic and 
cross-border investments. Regression results for all hypotheses are presented in Table 
VII. The corresponding marginal effects for the probit regressions are reported in Table 
VIII. Finally, the results of our time series analysis and robustness tests are presented in 
Tables IX and Table X. 
  Our first set of hypotheses is concerned with deal sourcing and selection. 
Consistent with H1, we find that cross-border investments are indeed made in older firms 
(0.01; p≤ .001) that are less likely to be in early stages of development (-0.22; p≤ .001). 
Specifically, the average age of the cross-border target firm at first investment was 8.5 
years as compared to 4.65 for domestic firms. Also, 10.7% of domestic deals were in 
early stage companies as compared to 7.5% of cross border deals.
2 Model 2 of Table VII 
indicates that syndicates that include a local partner tend to invest in younger (-0.00; p≤ 
.001) and earlier stage (0.42; p≤ .001) companies. However, the practical significance of 
these findings (Table VIII: model 2) is quite low: investments involving local investors 
do not materially differ in age from those that do not (0.00; p≤ .001), and the involvement 
of a local investor increases the probability of earlier stage investment by only 2.5% (p≤ 
.001). We conclude H1 is supported but that support for H2 is weak. 
                                                 
2 Other tests (not reported) show that 71% of cross-border deals were in late stage 
investments as compared to 58% of domestic deals. 
24We now turn to questions concerning investment practice. Consistent with 
received wisdom about distance-related risk and syndicate size, negative binomial 
regression results for H3 (Table VII: model 3 & 4) indicate that cross-border investment 
syndicates are larger than domestic syndicates (0.17; p≤ .001). Interestingly, but contrary 
to H4, syndicate size rises when local partners are included (0.19; p≤ .001). Specifically, 
the average size of a cross-border syndicate that includes a local investor is 2.2 as 
compared to 1.5 for cross-border syndicates that exclude local investors. Accordingly, we 
accept H3 but reject H4.Together, these results hint that diversification of risk may be 
more critical to investors than the provision of improved (and less costly) supervision by 
a local partner. 
Results for hypotheses concerning round amount and timing are similarly contrary 
to received wisdom. Cross-border and domestic investment rounds do not differ in 
amount and the interval between rounds is longer for cross-border investments (0.00; p≤ 
.001). Specifically, and as shown in Table VI, the average interval between cross-border 
round is 421 days compared to 365 days for domestic rounds of investment. We therefore 
reject H5. The involvement of a local partner (H6) has no influence on the round amount. 
Curiously, the participation of a local investor in the syndicate is negatively related to 
time between rounds (0.00; p≤ .001) but, as indicated in Table VIII, which reports the 
marginal effects for each relationship, the difference (less than 1 day) is not materially 
significant. We reject H6. Collectively, results for H1 to H6 indicate the local partner has 
a marginal influence on stage of investment (H2), but not on any other dimension of deal 
sourcing or structure (H1& H3 to H6).  
25  Results for H7 and H8 tell an intriguing story. Interestingly, and consistent with 
the view that cross-border investments are risky and hence require more stringent 
monitoring, results (Table VII: model 7) indicate that syndicate members are more likely 
to take a board seat in cross-border investments than in domestic investments (0.13; p≤ 
.001). However, results for H8 (Table VII: model 8) indicate a reduced probability they 
will do so if a local investor is involved (-0.99; p≤ .001). The marginal effects reported in 
Table VIII confirm this finding is material: the probability that a given syndicate member 
will take a board seat when a local investor is involved is reduced by 36%. While this 
result is perplexing, it is probable that this outcome is the product of mechanical 
relationships among the variables. Recall that we, unfortunately, are unable to identify 
which syndicate member took the board seat. Hence, our regression merely estimates the 
probability that a given syndicate member will take a board seat. It follows that since the 
median size of a cross-border syndicate that includes a local investor is three, as 
compared to a syndicate size of two for those that exclude local investors, the probability 
that a given member will take a board seat should necessarily fall by about 1/3
rd – which 
is what our marginal effects table shows.
3 We reject H7 but are concerned that the results 
for H8 may not be reliable. Results for H7 combined with results for H1 and H3 to H6, 
further confirm that the local investor does not appear to play an active role in the 
investment syndicate.  
  Finally, and perhaps most provocatively, the data indicate that cross-border 
investments are significantly more likely to exit than domestic investments. Specifically, 
cross-border investments are more likely exit via IPO (0.16; p≤ .001) or M&A (0.14; p≤ 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, we suspect our results for H8 would have been interpretable if H4 had 
been supported. This outcome  
26.001) than domestic investments. These findings are material: Table VIII (models 9 to 12) 
shows the average cross-border investment is about 3.1% more likely to exit via IPO and 
3.2% more likely to exit via M&A than a domestic investment. Curiously, the 
participation of a local investor in the cross-border deal is does not influence the 
probability of IPO and is negatively related to exit via M&A (-0.17; p≤ .001). In fact, the 
involvement of the local investor reduces the probability of exit via M&A by 2.2%, a 
material difference. We infer support for H9 and H10.  
  
PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND ROBUSTNESS 
  Since the data used in this study includes venture capital investments executed 
between 1980 and 2009, it stands to reason that ebbs and flows in rates of venture capital 
investment over this 29 year period – a period marked by one boom (1996) and three 
financial crisis (1987, 2001, 2008) may affect the observed relationships with 
performance. Investment practice may also have changed over this time span. 
Accordingly, we tested all our models using three to five year windows, and split the data 
into recognized investment phases. These include 1980 to 1987 (which is when financial 
conditions changed due the subprime bond crisis), 1988 to 1992 (the close of 
biotechnology window), 1993 to 1996 (pre-dot.com), 1997 to 2001 (the dot.com era), and 
2002 to 2007 (the mortgage crisis) and 2007 to 2009.  
We observe little practical difference in relationships across these periods, and so 
report the five-year windows in Table IX. The number of observations confirm cross-
border investment has become increasingly common, but show little evidence of 
changing cross-border investment practice over the period. Effect sizes are relatively 
27consistent in magnitude and sign between 1991 and 2009 (Panel A). There is also little 
change in deal structure over the entire period. The main effects for round amount and 
timing seat are stable across the period (Panel B). However, it appears that syndicates 
were less likely to take a board seat cross-border investments in the period 2006-2009 (-
0.30; p≤ .001) as compared to earlier periods (1986-1990; 1996-2000) when syndicate 
members were more likely to take a board seat with cross-border investment (Panel C). 
The data also indicate that the relationship between cross-border investment and IPO is 
stable and significant (Panel D shows a positive relationship from 1990 to 2009) but that 
the relationship between cross-border investment and M&A (Panel F) is sensitive to time 
period. The relationship is significant (0.12; p≤ .001) in only one time period: 2001-2005. 
On the whole, we conclude model 1 through 6 suggest that our main findings reliably 
reflect established investment practice. 
We also test the sensitivity of our results to country-specific risk by substituting 
Country Risk Premium and Political Risk for our country dummy variables. Although the 
sample is truncated (results are only available for the period 1996-2009) Table X 
indicates that the effects do not materially differ from those reported in Table VII with 
respect to direction or significance. (Differences in effect sizes are not directly 
interpretable due to changes in sample size.) We conclude our results are robust with 
respect to time period and country specification.  
 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we examined the influence of geographic proximity and local 
networks on cross-border venture capital investment. Our results are surprising. Results 
indicate that deal sourcing and deal structure change as our hypotheses suggest: cross-
28border invests do tend to be in older, later-stage companies and syndicates do tend to be 
larger. However, and contrary to received wisdom about the effect of distance-related risk 
on staging, monitoring, and governance, investment rounds are about the same size and 
the time between rounds is longer, not shorter. Moreover, distance does not appear to 
deter board membership. Syndicates are more likely to take a board seat in cross-border 
investments than in domestic investments. Finally, and as hypothesized, cross-border 
investment is positively related to performance. Specifically, investments have a 
materially increased probability of exit via IPO. Results concerning M&A appear to be 
time-period dependent and so may lack conclusion validity.  
  Interestingly, results concerning the network hypothesis found no support. We 
contrasted cross-border investments that involved a local partner with those that did not, 
and found no difference with respect to target investment firm age or risk, and only a 
small marginal difference for stage of investment. Specifically, it appears that syndicates 
that include local partners are about 2.5% more likely to invest in earlier stage companies 
than cross-border syndicates that do not involve a local partner. Cross-border syndicates 
that include local partners are larger than those that do not, but these partners do not 
appear to influence round size or timing. The availability of a local partner appears to 
reduce the probability that a syndicate member will take a seat on the board of the local 
firm, although we cannot rule out that this outcome is an artifact of mechanical 
relationships between board governance and syndicate size. Finally, local partners do not 
appear to not help, and perhaps harm, firm performance. Syndicates involving local 
partners are no more likely to exit via IPO than those that do not, but those that involve 
29local partners were less likely to via M&A than cross-border deals that do not involve a 
local partner in at least one recent five-year period.  
On the whole, then, we find little evidence to suggest that local partners play a 
positive role in investment practice. The data are consistent with the view that VCs 
primarily manage risk through deal selection and syndication practice, but do not use 
staging as an important tool for risk management. The role of the local partner in the 
syndicate appears to be largely functional. That is, they appear add to or complement the 
resources and services provided by the syndicates (e.g., larger rounds, larger board size) 
as opposed to serving as a substitute source of resources and services.  
  Several findings are surprising. For example, deal staging has long been viewed 
as one of the most powerful and effective monitoring tool available to investors, yet we 
find no evidence this tool is employed by cross-border investors. The core implicit 
assumption of the proximity hypothesis is that local VCs are able to add value to the 
portfolio firm, thereby enhancing the probability of success. Domestic investments 
should then out-perform cross-border investments. None of our results support this 
conclusion. Thus, and contrary to network theory, we find no evidence to suggest that 
partnering with a local investor yields any material benefit to syndicate members.  
  So what should we make of these results? In the main, we believe the data support 
the conclusion that VC generates positive returns through deal sourcing and through 
management of risk, not through value-added activities like monitoring. Changes to 
syndicate size, and the positive relationship between cross-border investment and the 
likelihood that a syndicate member will take a board seat, also point to a concern for the 
management of risk, as opposed to efforts to improve the operating performance of 
30portfolio firms. The fact that the participation of the local investor did not alter 
investment practice as hypothesized is also intriguing, since it is not only at odds with 
received wisdom about the value of local information but also raises important questions 
about the ability of local investor to leverage network benefits.  
The paper has several weaknesses. The first, and most vexing to us, is that we 
lack any measure of the centrality of the local partner within the local network. Network 
theory recognizes that benefits are more readily available to those firms that are centrally 
located and have high status – which is usually measured as a function of fund size or 
number of prior investments. Thus, the fact we are unable to identify the lead partner—
and use that information to create stronger network measures—is a severe handicap. 
Because we treated all local members alike, it is possible that our study simply failed to 
capture the detail needed to test the theory. The fact we were able to control for a 
dimension of experience, as indicated by the average number of prior international 
investments by individual syndicate members, does, however, somewhat ameliorate this 
concern.  
  Another limitation of the study is that it relies on a coarse metric for distance—the 
cross-border setting. While we think it is quite reasonable to conclude that crossing a 
border exposes increases distance-related risk to the point where the theorized changes in 
deal sourcing, structure, monitoring, and performance should be observed, it remains that 
the cross-border context itself may be distinctive, thereby altering the effects of distance-
related risk. Existing studies of distance-related risk were conducted in the USA, a 
context in which law and regulation are unchanged and the language is common. An 
advantage of USA samples is that one can more precisely isolate the effects of distance. 
31Bengtsson & Ravid (2010), for example, find that contractual harshness varies in 5, 10, 
20, and 100-mile increments. On the other hand, the dataset we use also includes the EU-
15, a region that shares a common business language, currency, and regulation, and so 
should have a relatively uniform effect on investment practice. The strong positive 
correlation between cross-border investment and country-financial risk is also reassuring 
and lends support to our claim that cross-border risk and financial risk have similar 
effects. Evidence that our results are robust with respect to specification (i.e., country, 
country risk premium, and political risk) also lends credence to our findings.  
While it is clear that the existing study has important limitations, the fact remains 
that our dataset is encompasses a 29-year period and bases its measure on a very large 
sample of transactions that occurred over this period. Our estimates of effect sizes are 
therefore highly reliable, and the risks of Type I and Type II error are empirically nil. The 
lack of support for some hypotheses then poses a strong challenge to the received wisdom 
that, in many cases, predicted the opposite outcome.  
These results create a conundrum for existing theory and research. The local 
business/network hypothesis asserts that VCs differentiate on the basis of their ability to 
add value to portfolio firms. If true, we would expect them to use the same playbook 
abroad. Evidence that they generate returns through deal selection and risk management, 
and not via value-added activities, then raises important questions about the 
generalizability of the theory on the whole, and about the merits of the value-added 
proposition in particular. These results, along with Chen et al (2010) and Chemmaneur et 
al (2010), provide mounting evidence that the conventional wisdom about VC investment 
32merits further scrutiny. The need for more research, using finer-grained data in large 
samples is clear, as is the need for better theory about the VC investment phenomena.  
33 
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TABLE I: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 Mean  SD  Median  Max  Min  Obs 
Cross-Border Round  0.12  0.32  0  1  0  139892 
Local Investor  0.93  0.25  0  1  0  139892 
Target Age First Investment   5.11  12.16  1  107  0  139892 
Early Stage  0.10  0.30  0  1  0  139892 
Country Risk Premium  0.0068  0.0042  0  0.08  0  42611 
Syndicate Size  2.38  2.24  2  33  1  139892 
Prior International Investment 1.47  4.11  0  125  0  139892 
Round Amount  369.52  266.73  306  999  0.2  139892 
Time Between Rounds (Days)  288.45  605.01  99  14912  0  139892 
Board Seat  0.53  0.50  1  1  0  139892 
IPO 0.16  0.36  0  1  0  139892 
M&A 0.14  0.34  0  1  0  139892 
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TABLE II: CORRELATION TABLE 
   
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
1  Cross-Border  Round  1.00                  
2  Local  Investor  -0.53  1.00                
3  Target Age First Investment (Years)  0.10  -0.05  1.00                   
4  Early  Stage  -0.03  0.03  -0.11  1.00            
5  Country Risk Premium  0.09  -0.08  0.03  0.04  1.00               
6  Syndicate  Size  -0.07  0.10  -0.10  -0.04  -0.06  1.00        
7 Prior  International  Investment  0.22  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01 -0.11 1.00           
8 Round  Amount  -0.05  0.02  -0.05  0.11  0.00  -0.12  -0.01  1.00         
9  Time Between Rounds (Days)  0.00  0.04  0.03  -0.11  -0.03  0.03  0.03  -0.03  1.00       
10  Board  Seat  -0.09 0.13 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 0.15 0.15 -0.08  0.07 1.00     
11  IPO  -0.05 0.02  0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.11 0.11 1.00   
12  M&A  -0.13 0.08 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.09 -0.06  -0.01  0.02 0.14 -0.06  1.00 
  n=139,892. Pairwise correlations greater than .01 are significant at p ≤ 0.05 or better          
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TABLE III:  VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT 1980-2009 
Round 
Year 
Number of 
Rounds 
Number of 
Cross-
Border 
Rounds 
New 
Portfolio 
Firms 
Receiving 
Cross-
Border 
Investment 
Amount of 
Venture 
Investment 
(Thousand 
USD) 
Amount of 
Cross-
Border 
Investment 
(Thousand 
USD) 
Cross-
Border 
Investment 
as % of 
Total 
Investment 
1980 592  7  7  743  4  0.54 
1981 967  14  12  1,593  10  0.64 
1982 1,392  28  24  2,055  34  1.65 
1983 1,729  50  25  3,768  87  2.31 
1984 1,913  53  23  4,243  107  2.51 
1985 1,857  57  23  4,055  112  2.75 
1986 2,067  54  27  5,762  110  1.9 
1987 2,394  51  26  8,401  140  1.67 
1988 2,370  37  14  9,263  184  1.99 
1989 2,553  77  47  12,326  218  1.77 
1990 2,280  90  47  9,078  261  2.88 
1991 1,897  91  40  4,837  402  8.31 
1992 2,298  107  57  9,027  354  3.92 
1993 2,047  111  52  7,141  415  5.82 
1994 2,198  136  76  9,066  315  3.48 
1995 2,922  158  90  14,798  574  3.88 
1996 4,422  334  193  26,659  1,613  6.05 
1997 4,936  262  185  31,594  1,688  5.34 
1998 6,437  468  350  52,520  5,332  10.15 
1999 8,348  897  708  107,473 14,268  13.28 
2000 12,129  1,720  1,128  164,649  23,376  14.2 
2001 9,125  1,548  788  79,074  15,050  19.03 
2002 6,035  1,034  502  62,620  14,634  23.37 
2003 7,465  1,421  773  73,659  11,839  16.07 
2004 8,040  1,567  823  69,189  9,907  14.32 
2005 7,961  1,492  811  70,615  11,216  15.88 
2006 9,039  1,423  902  98,278  18,534  18.86 
2007 9,344  1,328  905  120,386 18,696  15.53 
2008 8,964  1,190  698  114,502 14,620  12.77 
2009 6,172  786  421  4,004  93  2.31 
Total 139,892  16,591  9,777  1,181,378 164,193  8.04 
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                      TABLE IV: INVESTMENT BY INDUSTRY  
 
 
    
                  ALL DEALS (FULL SAMPLE)         CROSS-BORDER DEALS ONLY 
   Frequency Percent  Cumulative Frequency Percent Cumulative 
1 Computer  Software  21,538  15.2%  0.32  Computer Software  1,932  11.6%  100 
2  Internet Ecommerce  6,141  4.3%  0.47  Financial Services  1,067  6.4%  97.05 
3 Financial  Services  6,091  4.3%  0.58  Biotech-Human  861  5.2%  96.76 
4 Biotech-Human  6,077  4.3%  1.17  Business  Services  723  4.3%  95.52 
5 Business  Services  4,718  3.3%  1.24  Transportation  653  3.9%  91.61 
6 Semiconductors/Other 
Electronics 
4,544 3.2%  1.76  Internet  Ecommerce  624  3.7%  90.79 
7 Medical  Therapeutics  4,485  3.2%  2.18  Manufacturing  597  3.6%  88.04 
8  Data Communications  4,481  3.2%  6.48  Consumer Products  523  3.1%  87.73 
9 Internet  Content  4,029  2.8%  6.84  Wireless 
Communications 
493 3.0% 87.46 
10 Wireless 
Communications 
3,492 2.5%  10.17  Semiconductors/Other 
Electronics 
458 2.7% 85.84 
11  Manufacturing  3,486  2.5%  12.02  Chemicals and Materials  447  2.7%  85.66 
12 Med/Health  Services  3,190  2.3%  12.32  Internet  Content  437  2.6%  84.89 
13  Consumer Products  2,925  2.1%  14.3  Industrial Equipment  432  2.6%  82.46 
14 Transportation  2,872  2.0%  14.54  Pharmaceutical  405  2.4%  80.88 
15  Internet Communications  2,837  2.0%  15.8  Food and Beverage  392  2.3%  80.47 
16  Commer. Comm.  2,794  2.0%  16.46  Consumer Services  368  2.2%  79.84 
17 Pharmaceutical  2,647  1.9%  17.51  Data  Comm.  332  2.0%  78.24 
18  Chemicals and Materials  2,620  1.9% 32.72  Construction  326  2.0%  77.13 
19  Internet Software  2,583  1.8%  33.63  Entertainment and 
Leisure 
322 1.9% 75.59 
20 Consumer  Services  2,565  1.8%  34.65  Internet Communications  306  1.8%  74.12 
21  Medical Diagnostics  2,503  1.8%  36.72  Retailing Related  269  1.6%  70.54 
  Industries not shown individually represent less than 1.8% of the full sample, and less than 1.6% of the cross-border 
sample 
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Table V: Total Number of Rounds By Nation 
 
 Rounds  Percentage  Cumulative 
United States  107,448  76.81  100 
United Kingdom  9,902  7.08  23.19 
France 6,328  4.52  7.52 
Germany 3,761  2.69 10.21 
Sweden 2,377  1.7  16.11 
Netherlands 1,851 1.32  13.02 
Finland 1,783  1.27  3 
Spain 1,371  0.98  14.41 
Italy 1,080  0.77  11.62 
Denmark 1,075  0.77  1.72 
Belgium 860  0.61  0.95 
Ireland 821  0.59  10.85 
Portugal 574  0.41  13.43 
Austria 472  0.34  0.34 
Luxembourg 113  0.08  11.7 
Greece 76  0.05  10.26 
Total 139,892  100    
        
 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
  TABLE VI:  T-TEST OF MEANS     
          
  Domestic Cross-Border Difference T-Statistic N  (0/1) 
Local Investor  0.982  0.580  0.402  104.920  139892/16591
Target Age First Investment   4.650 8.500 -3.850  -28.120  139892/16591
Early Stage  0.107  0.075  0.032  14.480  139892/16591
Country Risk Premium  0.000  0.001  0.001  -14.920  46211/11102 
Syndicate Size  2.440  1.931  0.509  37.280  139892/16591
Prior International Investment 1.970 6.231 -4.260  -53.020  139892/16591
Round Amount  288.202  290.443  -2.241  -0.459  139892/16591
Time Between Rounds (Days)  365.827  420.998  -55.171  -8.247  139892/16591
Board Seat  0.546  0.416  0.130  32.042  139892/16591
IPO 0.163  0.110  0.053  19.670  139892/16591
M&A 0.153  0.020  0.133  89.600  139892/16591
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Cross-Border 
Investment
Cross-Border 
Investment Syndicate Size Syndicate Size
Cross-Border 
Investment Board Seat Board Seat IPO IPO M&A M&A
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (11) (10) (12)
Cross Border Round - - 0.172*** 0.104*** - 0.127*** 0.860*** 0.164*** 0.169*** 0.141*** 0.371***
- - [0.008] [0.007] - [0.019] [0.039] [0.021] [0.048] [0.035] [0.065]
Local Investor -2.361*** -2.383*** 0.377*** -0.176*** -2.325*** 0.024 0.784*** - -0.04 - 0.320***
[0.025] [0.028] [0.011] [0.010] [0.027] [0.017] [0.034] - [0.040] - [0.044]
Target Age First Investment (Years) 0.006*** 0.010*** -0.004*** -0.001*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0 0
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Early Stage -0.220*** -0.590*** -0.185*** -0.015** -0.219*** -0.040*** -0.035*** -0.357*** -0.356*** -0.046*** -0.046***
[0.025] [0.067] [0.007] [0.006] - [0.013] [0.013] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016]
Syndicate Size 0.103*** 0.103*** - - 0.103*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.004* 0.004* 0.024*** 0.023***
[0.003] [0.003] - - [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Prior International Investment 0.031*** 0.031*** -0.045*** -0.021*** 0.031*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.002** 0.002*** -0.006*** -0.006***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Round Amount -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 0 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Time Between Rounds (Days) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Board Seat 0.023 0.023 0.290*** 0.126*** 0.021 - - 0.896*** 0.896*** 0.388*** 0.381***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.005] [0.004] [0.017] - - [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
Local * Target Age First Investment - -0.004** - - - ------
- [ 0 . 0 0 2 ] ---------
L o c a l  *  E a r l y  S t a g e - 0 . 4 2 4 * * * ---------
- [ 0 . 0 7 2 ] ---------
Local * Syndicate Size - - - 0.189*** - ------
--- [ 0 . 0 0 1 ] -------
L o c a l  *  R o u n d  A m o u n t ----0------
---- [ 0 . 0 0 0 ] ------
Local * Time Between Rounds (Days) - - - - -0.000*** ------
---- [ 0 . 0 0 0 ] ------
L o c a l  *  C r o s s  B o r d e r  I n v e s t m e n t ------ - 0 . 991*** - -0.04 - -0.167**
------ [ 0 . 041] - [0.051] - [0.072]
C o u n t r y  C o n t r o l s Y e sY e sN oY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e sY e s
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.378*** 1.400*** 37.881*** 3.575*** 1.318*** -3.037*** -3.804*** -0.415*** -0.379** -0.415*** -7.292
[0.307] [0.309] [0.654] [0.590] [0.312] [0.118] [0.123] [0.142] [0.148] [0.142] [156.129]
Observations 139,892 139,892 139,892 139,892 139,892 139,892 139,892 139,892 139,892 139,892 139,892
Standard errors in brackets: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE VII:   HYPOTHESIS TESTS
Selection and Structuring Monitoring & Governance Performance
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Cross-
Border 
Investment
Cross-
Border 
Investment
Cross-
Border 
Investment Board Seat Board Seat IPO M&A IPO M&A
(1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cross Border Round - - - -0.011* 0.303*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.067***
- - - [0.006] [0.011] [0.004] [0.006] [0.010] [0.014]
Local Investor -0.518*** -0.527*** -0.505*** - 0.298*** - - -0.007 0.039***
[0.009] [0.010] [0.010] - [0.011] - - [0.007] [0.004]
Target Age First Investment (Years) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0 0.002*** 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Early Stage -0.008*** -0.015*** -0.007*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.051*** -0.007*** -0.051*** -0.007***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Syndicate Size 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.001* 0.004*** 0.001* 0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Prior International Investment 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.000** -0.001*** 0.000*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Round Amount 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Time Between Rounds (Days) -0.000*** -0.000*** 0 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Board Seat 0.001 0.001 0.001 - - 0.153*** 0.057*** 0.153*** 0.056***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] - - [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Local * Target Age First Investment - -0.000** - - - - - - -
- [ 0 . 0 0 0 ] -------
Local * Early Stage - 0.025*** - - - - - - -
- [ 0 . 0 0 6 ] -------
L o c a l  *  R o u n d  A m o u n t --0------
- - [0.000] - - - - - -
Local * Time Between Rounds (Day - - -0.000*** - - - - - -
- - [0.000] - - - - - -
Local * Cross Border Investment - - - - -0.363*** - - -0.007 -0.022***
- - - - [0.012] - - [0.008] [0.009]
Country Controls Yes Yes N Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Ye Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Controls Yes Yes Ye Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 139,892 139,892 139,892 139,892 139,892 139,892 139,892 139,892 139,892
Standard errors in brackets: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Selection and Structuring
TABLE VIII:  MARGINAL EFFECTS
Monitoring and Governance Performance
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TABLE IX: Year Effects 
    
Panel A 
Cross-
Border 
Investment 
Cross-
Border 
Investment 
Cross-
Border 
Investment 
Cross-
Border 
Investment
Cross-
Border 
Investment 
Cross-
Border 
Investment 
  1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2009 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cross  Border  Round  - - - - - - 
  - - - - - - 
Local  Investor  -3.514*** -3.213*** -3.080*** -1.492*** -3.165*** -3.142*** 
  [0.190] [0.146] [0.142] [0.038] [0.065] [0.074] 
Target Age First Investment 
(Years) -0.004  0.006  0.005  0.007***  0.006***  0.004*** 
  [0.009] [0.006] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Early Stage  0.21  0.005  -0.101  -0.218***  -0.220***  -0.265*** 
  [0.171] [0.173] [0.170] [0.048] [0.039] [0.058] 
Syndicate Size  -0.01  -0.007  0.077***  0.086***  0.149***  0.182*** 
  [0.020] [0.019] [0.026] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008] 
Prior International Investment 0.006  0.018  0.052***  0.044***  0.034***  0.020*** 
  [0.027] [0.025] [0.010] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
Round  Amount  0 0.000** 0  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Time Between Rounds (Days)  0  0  0  -0.000***  0  -0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Board  Seat  0.027 0.270* 0.014  0.288***  -0.039  -0.299*** 
  [0.192] [0.144] [0.117] [0.034] [0.027] [0.034] 
        
Constant 0.996*  0.346  2.735**  1.033***  2.083***  2.790*** 
  [0.572] [0.847] [1.109] [0.279] [0.207] [0.240] 
        
Observations  7,739  10,764 10,768 36,259 38,619 33,487 
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TABLE IX: Year Effects 
    
Panel B 
Syndicate 
Size 
Syndicate 
Size 
Syndicate 
Size 
Syndicate 
Size 
Syndicate 
Size 
Syndicate 
Size 
  1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2009 
  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Cross Border Round  -0.075  -0.272***  -0.182***  0.111***  0.137***  0.172*** 
  [0.055] [0.053] [0.053] [0.015] [0.011] [0.014] 
Local  Investor  -0.886*** -0.899*** -0.591*** -0.076***  -0.039**  -0.062*** 
  [0.041] [0.041] [0.054] [0.018] [0.020] [0.023] 
Target Age First Investment 
(Years) -0.003**  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001***  -0.001**  -0.001*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Early  Stage  0.033* 0.062*** 0.038*  -0.036***  -0.091*** -0.024 
  [0.017] [0.017] [0.020] [0.012] [0.016] [0.016] 
Syndicate  Size  - - - - - - 
  - - - - - - 
Prior International Investment  -0.074*** -0.068*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.023*** 
  [0.011] [0.007] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Round  Amount  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Time Between Rounds (Days)  0  0  -0.000*  0  0  0 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Board  Seat  0.053*** 0.104*** 0.070*** 0.080*** 0.140*** 0.168*** 
  [0.019] [0.014] [0.014] [0.008] [0.009] [0.010] 
          
Constant -13.5  28.497***  2.114  3.947  -14.882*** 7.886 
  [9.152] [8.837] [9.399] [5.495] [4.827] [7.148] 
        
Observations  8,450  11,664 11,362 36,269 38,625 33,512 
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    TABLE IX: Year Effects    
Panel C  Board Seat  Board Seat  Board Seat  Board Seat  Board Seat  Board Seat 
    1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2009 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Cross Border Round  -0.162  0.028  0.252***  0.148***  -0.077***   
  [0.129] [0.106] [0.089] [0.033] [0.023]   
Local  Investor  - - - - -  
  - - - - -  
Target Age First Investment 
(Years)  0.011*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.002***   
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]   
Early Stage  0.152***  0.084**  0.037  -0.053**  -0.118***   
  [0.045] [0.037] [0.037] [0.023] [0.029]   
Syndicate  Size  0.023*** 0.025*** 0.088*** 0.066*** 0.087***   
  [0.006] [0.004] [0.007] [0.004] [0.005]   
Prior International Investment  0.135*** 0.135*** 0.065*** 0.059*** 0.065***   
  [0.010] [0.008] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002]   
Round Amount  0.000**  0.000*  0  0  0.000***   
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
Time Between Rounds (Days)  -0.000**  0  0  -0.000***  -0.000***   
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
Board  Seat  - - - - -  
  - - - - -  
        
Constant -1.275***  -1.697***  -6.767  -1.314***  -1.363***   
 [0.231]  [0.292]  [113.595] [0.197]  [0.170]   
         
Observations 8,370  11,623  11,305  36,269  38,619   
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TABLE IX: Year Effects 
    
  IPO  IPO  IPO  IPO  IPO  IPO 
Panel D  1980-1985  1986-1990 
1991-
1995  1996-2000  2001-2005  2006-2009 
  (19)  (20)  (21) (22)  (23)  (24) 
Cross Border Round  0.006  0.013  0.372***  0.256***  0.200***  0.094** 
 [0.107]  [0.105]  [0.091]  [0.044]  [0.034]  [0.047] 
Local Investor 
 -   -  -  -  -  - 
Target Age First Investment   0.009*** 0.006***  0.003**  0.009***  0.009***  0.009*** 
 [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001] 
Early Stage  -0.201***  -0.141*** 
-
0.419***  -0.500***  -0.646***  -1.058*** 
 [0.039]  [0.037]  [0.041]  [0.033]  [0.065]  [0.140] 
Syndicate Size  0  0.007  -0.005  0.005  -0.002  -0.059*** 
 [0.005]  [0.004]  [0.007]  [0.004] [0.005]  [0.008] 
Prior International Investment  0.043***  0.007  0.001  -0.002  0.002*  0.011*** 
 [0.009]  [0.006]  [0.004]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.002] 
Round Amount  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
Time Between Rounds (Days)  -0.000***  0 
-
0.000***  0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Board Seat  0.973***  0.954***  0.957***  0.818***  0.782***  0.793*** 
 [0.045]  [0.030]  [0.029]  [0.019]  [0.029]  [0.039] 
Constant  -0.612***  -0.994*** -5.901  -1.799***  -2.176***  -2.309*** 
 [0.190]  [0.218]  [152.346] [0.254]  [0.255] [0.301] 
           
Observations  8,409  11,609  11,315  36,244  38,364  33,403 
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TABLE IX: Year Effects 
    
  M&A M&A M&A M&A M&A M&A 
Panel F  1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2009 
  (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
Cross Border Round  0.195  0.119  -0.001  0.074  0.118*  0.161 
  [0.141] [0.134] [0.137] [0.063] [0.064] [0.104] 
Local  Investor  - - - - - - 
Target Age First Investment   -0.001  -0.005**  -0.003**  -0.004***  0.001  0.003*** 
  [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Early Stage  0.149***  -0.034  -0.023  -0.009  -0.199***  -0.289*** 
  [0.053] [0.043] [0.040] [0.027] [0.047] [0.059] 
Syndicate Size  0.016**  0.013**  0.030***  0.017***  0.036***  0.033*** 
  [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] 
Prior International Investment 0.052***  -0.003  -0.028***  -0.011***  -0.008***  0.003 
  [0.009] [0.007] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Round  Amount  0 0.000* 0  -0.000*  0.000***  0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Time Between Rounds (Days)  0  0  0  -0.000**  -0.000**  0 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Board  Seat  0.336*** 0.440*** 0.241*** 0.500*** 0.409*** 0.110*** 
  [0.058] [0.035] [0.029] [0.018] [0.024] [0.033] 
Constant  -0.612*** -0.994***  -5.901  -1.799*** -2.176*** -2.309*** 
 [0.190]  [0.218]  [152.346]  [0.254] [0.255] [0.301] 
        
Observations  8,409  11,609 11,315 36,244 38,364 33,403 
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TABLE X:   ROBUSTNESS TESTS – Political Risk 
Political Risk
Cross-
Border 
Investment
Cross-
Border 
Investment
Syndicate 
Size
Syndicate 
Size
Cross-
Border 
Investment Board Seat Board Seat IPO M&A IPO M&A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Cross Border Round - - 0.239*** 0.157*** -2.256*** -0.366*** 0.571*** 0.129*** -0.552*** 0.157*** -0.608***
- - [0.009] [0.008] [0.024] [0.014] [0.043] [0.020] [0.032] [0.059] [0.077]
Local Investor -2.278*** -2.321*** 0.458*** -0.062*** 0.006*** - 0.901*** - - -0.033 0.248***
[0.022] [0.025] [0.012] [0.012] [0.000] - [0.039] - - [0.053] [0.049]
Target Age First Investment (Years) 0.006*** 0.007*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.167*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.010*** 0.001 0.010*** 0.001
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.023] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
Early Stage -0.167*** -0.658*** -0.241*** -0.042*** 9.035*** -0.116*** -0.112*** -0.623*** -0.105*** -0.621*** -0.106***
[0.023] [0.066] [0.009] [0.008] [0.136] [0.015] [0.015] [0.029] [0.021] [0.029] [0.021]
Voice Accountability 9.040*** 9.042*** -0.883*** -0.346*** -0.905*** -3.585*** -3.580*** 0.388** -7.209*** 0.387** -7.270***
[0.136] [0.136] [0.067] [0.063] [0.115] [0.113] [0.113] [0.169] [0.288] [0.169] [0.291]
Political Stability -0.890*** -0.910*** -0.575*** -0.202*** -2.698*** 0.322*** 0.313*** -0.769*** 0.209 -0.803*** 0.258
[0.115] [0.115] [0.063] [0.059] [0.090] [0.105] [0.105] [0.165] [0.291] [0.166] [0.292]
Government Effectiveness -2.700*** -2.698*** 0.063 0.092* -6.035*** 3.539*** 3.556*** -0.586*** 5.569*** -0.586*** 5.626***
[0.090] [0.090] [0.051] [0.047] [0.114] [0.088] [0.088] [0.129] [0.302] [0.129] [0.304]
Regulative Quality -6.033*** -6.031*** 0.373*** 0.005 -2.151*** 1.227*** 1.215*** 0.127 4.090*** 0.147 4.090***
[0.114] [0.115] [0.064] [0.059] [0.122] [0.106] [0.106] [0.153] [0.270] [0.153] [0.273]
Rule of Law -2.147*** -2.151*** -0.053 -0.177*** 0.945*** 1.590*** 1.536*** -0.284* 1.282*** -0.268 1.252***
[0.122] [0.122] [0.066] [0.062] [0.069] [0.114] [0.114] [0.169] [0.267] [0.169] [0.270]
Control of Corruption 0.942*** 0.942*** -0.155*** -0.022 0.068*** -0.183*** -0.172*** -0.656*** -2.008*** -0.663*** -1.989***
[0.069] [0.069] [0.037] [0.034] [0.003] [0.063] [0.063] [0.093] [0.159] [0.093] [0.160]
Syndicate Size 0.068*** 0.068*** - - 0.051*** 0.106*** 0.102*** 0.002 0.031*** 0.003 0.030***
[0.003] [0.003] - - [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
Prior International Investment 0.051*** 0.051*** -0.041*** -0.018*** 0.000*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.002*** -0.010*** 0.003*** -0.010***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Round Amount 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Time Between Rounds (Days) -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0 -0.235*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.014] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Board Seat -0.232*** -0.233*** 0.304*** 0.119*** - - - 0.870*** 0.454*** 0.872*** 0.446***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.005] [0.005] - - - [0.015] [0.013] [0.015] [0.013]
L o c a l  *  T a r g e t  A g e  F i r s t  I n v e s t m e n t - - 0 . 0 0 1 ---------
- [0.002] - --------
Local * Early Stage - 0.554*** - --------
- [0.070] - --------
Local * Syndicate Size - - - 0.198*** -------
- - - [0.001] -------
Local * Round Amount - - - - 0.000*** ------
- - - - [0.000] ------
Local * Time Between Rounds (Days) ---- - 0 . 0 0 0 * * * ------
- - - - [0.000] ------
Local * Cross Border Investment - - - - - - -0.987*** - - -0.065 0.186**
[0.045] [0.062] [0.084]
Country Controls No No No No No No No No No No
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.757*** 0.742*** 0.636*** 2.703*** -3.224*** -4.066*** -1.457*** -5.933*** -1.429*** -6.200***
[0.200] [0.109] [0.101] [0.200] [0.178] [0.183] [0.270] [0.464] [0.275] [0.471]
Observations 108,406 108,406 108,406 108,406 108,406 108,406 108,406 108,385 108,406 108,385
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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 TABLE X:   ROBUSTNESS TESTS – Risk Premium  
  Cross-
Border 
Investment
Cross-
Border 
Investment
Syndicate 
Size
Syndicate 
Size
Cross-
Border 
Investment Board Seat Board Seat IPO M&A IPO M&A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Cross Border Round - - - 0.170*** - -0.545*** 0.198* 0.181*** -0.762*** -0.088 -1.004***
- - - [0.010] - [0.016] [0.104] [0.025] [0.047] [0.159] [0.196]
Local Investor -2.870*** -2.865*** 0.272*** -0.073*** -2.870*** - 0.600*** - - -0.346** 0.053
[0.039] [0.044] [0.010] [0.016] [0.042] - [0.102] - - [0.156] [0.169]
Target Age First Investment (Years) 0.006*** 0.005** 0.480*** -0.001** 0.006*** 0 0 0.008*** 0.002** 0.008*** 0.002**
[0.001] [0.002] [0.016] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Early Stage -0.150*** 0.074 -0.003*** -0.046*** -0.149*** -0.143*** -0.140*** -0.742*** -0.442*** -0.738*** -0.445***
[0.030] [0.194] [0.000] [0.013] [0.030] [0.024] [0.024] [0.066] [0.052] [0.066] [0.052]
Country Risk Premium 5.426*** 5.441*** -0.246*** -1.984** 5.428*** -13.912*** -14.471*** 5.593** 0.749 5.414** 0.665
[1.759] [1.760] [0.014] [0.979] [1.759] [2.016] [2.029] [2.264] [4.837] [2.265] [4.904]
Syndicate Size 0.018*** 0.018*** -3.192*** 0.018*** 0.185*** 0.188*** -0.031*** 0.055*** -0.030*** 0.054***
[0.005] [0.005] [1.016] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005]
Prior International Investment 0.048*** 0.048*** -0.047*** -0.021*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.006*** -0.020*** 0.007*** -0.021***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Round Amount 0 0 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Time Between Rounds (Days) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0 0 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Board Seat -0.504*** -0.504*** 0.379*** 0.159*** -0.504*** - - 0.686*** 0.321*** 0.688*** 0.320***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.008] [0.008] [0.018] - - [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] [0.027]
L o c a l  *  T a r g e t  A g e  F i r s t  I n v e s t m e n t - 0 . 0 0 1 ---------
- [ 0 . 0 0 2 ] ---------
L o c a l  *  E a r l y  S t a g e - - 0 . 2 3 ---------
- [ 0 . 1 9 6 ] ---------
L o c a l  *  C o u n t r y  R i s k  P r e m i u m-----------
-----------
L o c a l  *  S y n d i c a t e  S i z e --- 0 . 2 1 0 * * * -------
--- [ 0 . 0 0 2 ] -------
L o c a l  *  R o u n d  A m o u n t ----0------
---- [ 0 . 0 0 0 ] ------
Local * Time Between Rounds (Days) ----0------
---- [ 0 . 0 0 0 ] ------
Local * Cross Border Investment - - - - - - -0.844*** - - 0.225 0.349*
- - - - - - [0.106] - - [0.161] [0.202]
Country Controls No No No No No No No No No No
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.482*** 2.477*** -0.153** 0.121* 2.482*** -1.132*** -1.741*** -2.888*** -1.733*** -2.549*** -1.787***
[0.127] [0.128] [0.068] [0.066] [0.128] [0.109] [0.149] [0.226] [0.170] [0.274] [0.239]
Observations 46,211 46,211 46,211 46,211 46,211 46,211 46,211 45,880 44,626 45,880 44,626
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 1: Estimated Country Risk Premiums   
 
   
To estimate the long term country risk premium, we estimate the default spread for each nation by matching 
Moody’s Country Rating (www.moodys.com) to the equivalent rating for US Corporate and Country Bonds over the 
period 1980 to 2009. The default spread rating compares the risk of default for different classes of bonds as 
compared to US Treasury Bonds. We use the default spread as a proxy for the risk premium associated with debt for 
each nation. We then adjust it by multiplying the default spread by the relative market volatility for each market 
(SD_country equity/SD_Country Bond). The global average of equity to bond market volatility is 1.5. We then add 
the adjusted bond default spread to historical risk premium for a mature equity market (estimated from US historical 
data) to estimate the total risk premium of each nation.  
 
 
Country 
Long-Term 
Rating 
Adj. Default 
Spread 
Total Risk 
Premium 
Country Risk 
Premium 
Argentina B3  600  13.80%  9.00% 
Australia Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Austria Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Bahamas A1  60 5.70%  0.90% 
Bahrain Baa1  110  6.45%  1.65% 
Barbados A3  90 6.15%  1.35% 
Belgium Aa1  50 5.55%  0.75% 
Belize Caa3  700  15.30%  10.50% 
Bermuda Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Bolivia B3  600  13.80%  9.00% 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina B3  600  13.80%  9.00% 
Botswana A1  60  5.70%  0.90% 
Brazil Ba3  360  10.20%  5.40% 
Bulgaria Ba1  225  8.18%  3.38% 
Canada Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Cayman islands  Aa3  60  5.70%  0.90% 
Chile A1  60  5.70%  0.90% 
China A2  80  6.00%  1.20% 
Colombia Baa2  120  6.60%  1.80% 
Costa Ba1  225  8.18%  3.38% 
Croatia Baa1  110  6.45%  1.65% 
Cuba NR  700  15.30%  10.50% 
Cyprus A2  80  6.00%  1.20% 
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Country 
Long-Term 
Rating 
Adj. Default 
Spread 
Total Risk 
Premium 
Country Risk 
Premium 
Czech Republic  A1  60  5.70%  0.90% 
Denmark Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Dominican 
Republic  B3 600  13.80%  9.00% 
Ecuador B3  600  13.80%  9.00% 
Egypt Baa3  135  6.83%  2.03% 
El Salvador  Baa2  120  6.60%  1.80% 
Estonia A1  60  5.70%  0.90% 
Fiji Islands  Ba2  270  8.85%  4.05% 
Finland Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
France Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Germany Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Greece A1  60  5.70%  0.90% 
Guatemala Ba1  225  8.18%  3.38% 
Honduras B2  500  12.30%  7.50% 
Hong Kong  Aa3  60  5.70%  0.90% 
Hungary A1  60  5.70%  0.90% 
Iceland Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
India Ba2  270  8.85%  4.05% 
Indonesia B2  500  12.30%  7.50% 
Ireland Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Isle of Man  Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Israel A2  80 6.00%  1.20% 
Italy Aa2  55 5.63%  0.83% 
Jamaica Ba2  270  8.85%  4.05% 
Japan A2  80 6.00%  1.20% 
Jordan Baa3  135  6.83%  2.03% 
Kazakhstan Baa1  110 6.45%  1.65% 
Korea A3  90  6.15%  1.35% 
Kuwait A2  80  6.00%  1.20% 
Latvia A2  80  6.00%  1.20% 
Lebanon B3  600  13.80%  9.00% 
Liechtenstein Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Lithuania A3  90  6.15%  1.35% 
Luxembourg Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Macao A1  60  5.70%  0.90% 
Malaysia A3  90  6.15%  1.35% 
Malta A3  90 6.15%  1.35% 
Mauritius A2  80  6.00%  1.20% 
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Country 
Long-Term 
Rating 
Adj. Default 
Spread 
Total Risk 
Premium 
Country Risk 
Premium 
Mexico Baa1  110  6.45%  1.65% 
Moldova Caa1  700  15.30%  10.50% 
Monaco Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Mongolia B1  400  10.80%  6.00% 
Morocco Ba1  225  8.18%  3.38% 
Netherlands Aaa 0  4.80%  0.00% 
New Zealand  Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Nicaragua B3  600  13.80%  9.00% 
Norway Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Oman Baa1  110 6.45%  1.65% 
Pakistan B2  500 12.30%  7.50% 
Panama Ba1  225  8.18%  3.38% 
Papua & New 
Guinea B1  400  10.80%  6.00% 
Paraguay Caa1  700  15.30%  10.50% 
Peru Baa3  135  6.83%  2.03% 
Philippines B1  400  10.80%  6.00% 
Poland A2  80 6.00%  1.20% 
Portugal Aa2  55  5.63%  0.83% 
Qatar A1  60  5.70%  0.90% 
Romania Ba1  225  8.18%  3.38% 
Russia Baa2  120 6.60%  1.80% 
Saudi Arabia  A3  90  6.15%  1.35% 
Singapore Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Slovakia A2  80  6.00%  1.20% 
Slovenia Aa3  60  5.70%  0.90% 
South Africa  A2  80  6.00%  1.20% 
Spain Aaa  0 4.80%  0.00% 
Suriname Ba3  360  10.20%  5.40% 
Sweden Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Switzerland Aaa 0  4.80%  0.00% 
Taiwan Aaa3  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Thailand Baa1  110  6.45%  1.65% 
Trinidad & Tobago  Baa1  110  6.45%  1.65% 
Tunisia Baa2  120  6.60%  1.80% 
Turkey Ba3  360  10.20%  5.40% 
Turkmenistan B2  500  12.30%  7.50% 
Ukraine B1  400  10.80%  6.00% 
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Country 
Long-Term 
Rating 
Adj. Default 
Spread 
Total Risk 
Premium 
Country Risk 
Premium 
United Arab 
Emirates A1  60  5.70%  0.90% 
UK Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
US Aaa  0  4.80%  0.00% 
Uruguay B3  600 13.80%  9.00% 
Venezuela B1  400  10.80%  6.00% 
Vietnam Ba3  360 10.20%  5.40% 
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